JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Six Seductive Steps to Sin and Intoxication I think that the foundations for the revolution that we can now see occurring began to be developed in the early 1970s. These foundations consist of six events. Collectively these events provide the bases for the self-sustaining growth and use of experimental methods in both the basic scientific and in the applied scientific aspects of economics. Now, to me basic science is fun; so much so that it must be sinful. Experimentation is also intoxicating and habituating in the sense that the more one does the more one wants to do. Consequently I will refer to the six events that form the foundation for the growth of moder experimental methods as the "Six Seductive Steps to Sin and Intoxication."
Step 1: We Learned How to Pose a Question Prior to the early 1970s, the profession did not pose questions that could be answered by the application of experimental methodology. The questions primarily addressed aspects of economies as they are found growing wild in nature. Naturally occurring economies evolve in response to a wide variety of events and historical accidents. The possibility certainly exists that some of such events had nothing at all to do with any economic principles that might be at work. Economies found "in the wild," so to speak, are extremely complicated and the questions posed by the profession had to do with the properties of such creatures. Primarily the questions were about measurement and about the statistical properties of ongoing processes. (What is the elasticity of demand? What is the relationship between concentration and profits? What is the level of employment?) In order to learn about such statistical properties, the economy in question must be studied directly. The laboratory would seem to have nothing to contribute to such effort. The idea of performing replays of the historical evolution of an economy in order to get better observations does not make a lot of sense. Each observation would be very costly, to say the least.
Of course not all questions were about measurement. Many questions were about theory but even the theories tended to be directed to explanations about particular economies and particular situations in those economics. (What was the contribution of monetary policy to the great depression? What was the contribution of debt policies to the inflation of the 1960s? What were the causes of slums and ghettos in New York City? What were the contributions of technological change to the growth of the U.S. economy? What was the relationship between structure and performance in specific industries?) If the analysis is restricted to only questions of this sort, then only the data from these special economies, as they are found naturally evolving during a particular period of history, would seem to be relevant. Clearly, in many parts of economics a body of general theory had developed, but the focus of the profession was not so much on the general behavioral principles of the theory as it was on the application of theory to specific events. Again, in the absence of a capability to inexpensively replay history, a laboratory methodology would appear to have nothing to contribute.
Laboratory methodology involves a shift from a focus on particular economies as they are found in the wild to a focus on general theories, models and principles that govern the behavior of economies. This distinction between the study of an economy and the study of models, theories and principles of economics is subtle so an elaboration might prove useful. The logic is as follows. General theories must apply to simple special cases. The laboratory technology can be used to create simple (but real) economies. These simple economies can then be used to test and evaluate the predictive capability of the general theories when they are applied to the special cases. In this way, a joining of the general theories with data is accomplished.
Before continuing further, an example of a simple, laboratory economy consisting of one market will be given. People are assembled. Some of the people are designated as "buyers" and some are designated "sellers." Buyers are involved with the experimenter through a contract of the following sort. Buyer i is assigned a "redemption value" function, R (Xi) which indicates the amount of (real) dollars he or she will receive from the experimenter as a function of Xi, the quantity of the commodity purchased by i. The buyer i keeps as profits the difference between Ri(Xi) and whatever he or she paid to sellers for the units. Similarly, the experimenter's contract with seller j is that j will pay the experimenter an amount of dollars CJ (Xj) depending on the quantity, Xj, sold by j. Seller j keeps as (real dollar) profits the difference between the revenue he or she received from buyers and the cost paid to the experimenter. If the competitive model is applied to the market, then each buyer can be represented by a demand function that satisfies the equation (dRi(Xi))/aXi -P = 0. Each seller can be represented by a supply function that satisfies the equation P -ac (Xj)/OXj = 0. That is, the individual quantity demanded is determined by an equating of price to marginal benefits and the individual quantity supplied is determined by an equating of price to marginal cost. The market demand is derived by a sum of individual demand functions and the market supply is determined by the sum of individual supply functions. The competitive model then predicts that the price will be the one that equates market demand with market supply. Clearly the law of supply and demand is applied very generally and to economies much more complicated than the one just described. It is only natural to expect that if the law works in very complicated cases then one should expect it to work in the simple case as well. If it does not then a substantial reassessment of the theory would be in order. The conclusion of many laboratory experiments is that it does indeed work in the simple cases. Figure 2 are examples. Given some fixed "economic environment" of preferences, institution, and feasible sets, the outcomes predicted could be based on any of a number of different cooperative game theoretic models or the prediction could be based on any of a large number of noncooperative models. Consider first the cooperative model options. Cooperative game models can differ according to the choice of dominance relations and can differ depending upon the nature of the characteristic function. Differences in models can also reflect different selections from the set of solution concepts (core, bargaining sets, etc.). Even within the class of cooperative game models the number of models that could be applied to the same environment is large. However, cooperative models do not exhaust the possibilities. The model applied to the same environment might be based on noncooperative theoretic principles. Noncooperative theories can differ according to hypotheses about the information structure generated by the institutional arrangement. Figure 2 are firstly, that models of economies found in the wild tend to have a similar structure and that structure is captured by the fundamental equation. Secondly, such models are general models involving basic principles intended to have applicability independent of time and location except to the extent to which time and location have an effect on the variables of the fundamental equation, (preferences, institutions, information, and feasible sets). Third, we see that a staggeringly large number of theories exist. One purpose of the laboratory is to reduce the number by determining which do not work in the simple cases. The purpose is also to improve the models by exploring how a model might be changed to make it work better in the simple cases. General models, such as those applied to the very complicated economies found in the wild, must apply to simple special cases. Models that do not apply to the simple special cases are not general and thus cannot be viewed as such. The trick is to notice that economies created in the laboratories might be very simple relative to those found in nature, but they are just as real. Real people motivated by real money make real decisions, real mistakes and suffer real frustrations and delights because of their real talents and real limitations. Simplicity should not be confused with reality. Since the laboratory economies are real, the general principles and models that exist in the literature should be expected to apply with the same force to these laboratory economies as to those economies found in the field. The laboratories are simple but the simplicity is an advantage because it allows the reasons for a model's failure to be isolated and sometimes even measured.
The process of learning is roundabout A recognition of this roundabout means of learning removed two intellectual constraints which together had made laboratory methods useless. The first was a belief that the only relevant economies to study are those in the wild. This belief suggested that the only effective way to create an experiment would be to mirror in every detail, to simulate, so to speak, some ongoing natural process. Early experimenters were guilty of yielding to this belief and described experiments as simulations of a market [21] or attempted to include in their experiments much of the rich and complicating detail found in many markets [9] . As a result the experiments tended to be dismissed either because as simulations the experiments were incomplete or because as experiments they were so complicated that tests of models were unconvincing. In other words, the experiment would be dismissed either because it did not mirror some natural process, or because it did. Once models, as opposed to economies, became the focus of research the simplicity of an experiment and perhaps even the absence of features of more complicated economies became an asset. The 2. See Goodfellow and Plott [10] for a discussion of this issue. When a sharp differentiation between assumptions and principles is absent in the theory, the classical concept of testing a theory does not work.
Step 2: Some Important Discoveries Were Made During the very early years of experimentation, three very important discoveries were made. In some sense these establish a foundation for all subsequent work but they were not appreciated at the time. In fact, it is only recently, after many replications, and hundreds of experiments of different types, can we look back and recognize these early events as discoveries.
Chamberlin [ Step 3: Economic Theory Advanced
The stunning changes in theory that took place in the late 1970s and 1980s do not need to be reviewed here. Information became a key variable and, with this variable, scientific interest in noncooperative game theory which, for practical purposes, was a dead subject prior to the late 1970s, began to be stimulated. The newly developed tools of analysis suggested the existence of very subtle relationships among the actions taken by economic agents and the institutions in which they are operating. The implications of rationality of self and of others began to grow in importance. Efficiency began to expand from simple allocation efficiency to information efficiency and both began to depend critically upon the ability of agents to assimilate information from complex data and the knowledge that others could do the same. Slight changes in institutional form could have dramatic implications in terms of the predictions of the new game theoretic models. Critical features of models used in applications began to be so delicate that any testing in the field would be essentially hopeless. History does not often shape itself to suit the convenience of analysts who might like to test some of the very basic propositions about human actions and market behaviors that modem economic theory suggests might exist.
The matrix game represented in Figure 3 will provide some intuition about the issues for those who are not versed in game theory. In that game the outcome in the lower right hand corer is a Nash equilibrium. If row player chooses B and column player chooses C, neither has an incentive to change given the choice of the other. How might the system get there? Row player can see that column player will not choose B because for column player, B is dominated by both columns A and C. Furthermore, row player understands that column player understands that if column B is not played, then for row player row A is dominated by row B. So, row player is not likely to play A. It follows that column will play C. By such repeated arguments that apply not only rationality of self but also rationality of others, and so forth, a presumption exists that the lower right hand corer will be the outcome.
This role of rationality and public knowledge of rationality is an important feature of models and we will return to this feature of theory later. Even though the solution concepts might have dramatically different consequences for institutional behavior, the data needed to distinguish between them, to determine which of them is the most accurate, can only be revealed at certain critical points of the decision making process. If the data can only come from the field, and from repeated observations of special circumstances found there, then the appropriate tests will probably never be conducted. The only practical source of data that can be obtained within an appropriate time frame and serve as a guide for many of the newly developed theories is the laboratory.
Step 4: Laboratory Data Suggests that Theory Is on the Right Track It is one thing to say that the laboratory can be used as a source of data. It is very much another thing to say that something exists by way of theory that is worth the effort needed for a test. Experiments conducted in the late 1970s provided strong suggestions that modem theories were not completely hopeless and, indeed, appeared to be on the right track.
Many examples exist. The law of supply and demand was well established by the late 1970s.
The importance of the CORE of game representation of committee processes had also been well established by the late 1970s. Rational expectations had received strong support. In addition, the work with nonhuman animals in the early 1970s was extremely important because it leads directly to the hypothesis that a biological bases exists for the preference and optimization behavior that is so fundamental to modem theory.
Perhaps the easiest examples to explain are the experiments with sealed bid auctions. The theory of auctions is one of the most completely developed theories in the social and economic sciences. The theory is well developed in the sense that the basic principles of game theory can be applied to create a model for which many of the definitions and assumptions can be made operational and implemented in an experimental environment.
Consider an economic environment in which one unit of a good is sold by a sealed bid auction process. The values of each of n bidders are drawn independently from a probability density function f(v). Having knowledge of his or her own value v and the knowledge that the value of others are drawn from the same p.d.f., the individual must tender a sealed bid. The item is then sold to the highest bidder at his/her bid. The value of the object to each individual will, in general, be different. From the point of view of any single individual, the values of the other people are random with some known probability structure. Of course, the individual would like to purchase the object and obtain it at a low price. Paradoxes began to appear in many contexts. Three of the most fascinating will be considered here. They are, in turn, the winner's curse, the behavior in centipede experiments, and the existence of bubbles in asset markets. These three are interesting because the theory that served well to explain behavior in closely related experiments predicts that the phenomena observed in these experiments cannot exist as a matter of principle. The very existence of the phenomena suggests the need for a reworking of theory at a very fundamental level.
Specifically, if w is the wealth of the individual, and v is the value of the item to that individual, then the individual's utility given a winning bid at bid price b is u(w + v -b). The utility of the auction outcome if the individual fails to tender the winning bid is simply u (w). The problem faced by the individual who knows his/her own value v is to choose a bid. Since the bid depends upon the individual's value v, the implicit decision is the choice of a bid
Experiments in which the winner's curse is observed involve only a seemingly, slight alteration in the procedures of the first price auction experiments discussed in the section above. The structure is changed from a private value auction to a common value auction in which the value of the object sold is the same for all bidders. The value of the object is randomly determined. Each agent is then given a clue to the true value. The clue is drawn independently from a probability distribution that depends upon the true value. The agent must then determine a bid based upon the clue. .. ............ ............ ...... ...... ........... ............ The winner's curse phenomena, first observed experimentally by Kagel and Levine [13] is that the winning bid is almost always above the true value of the item. That is, the auction winner almost always loses money. The existence of the phenomena creates a paradox because models constructed from the basic principles of game theory predict that the phenomena cannot exist. [15] . The Lind and Plott experiment, conducted in the spirit of distrust, was a replication of the Kagel and Levine experiment. The signal seen by the individual is called "our sample." The bid tendered by the individual is called "our bid." As can be seen, this individual never followed the optimal bidding rule. The bids of this agent and the bids of others were always too high. The table shows that this agent saw losses occurring repeatedly to other agents in auction after auction and in period 4 experienced a loss himself.
The overbidding that contributes to the winner's curse phenomena is exhibited by almost all agents. It continues over repeated trials. When agents who exhibit Nash-type behavior in private value auctions are placed in common value auctions, the winner's curse immediately appears. How can individuals who otherwise appear so rational produce such "non-rational" behavior? That is the paradox. The resolution posed by Kagel and Levine was that individuals failed to properly compute an order statistic. If all individuals are rational, then bids increase with the value of the clue. This means that the individual with the largest clue (which will almost certainly be above the value of the item) will win the auction. The bid must then be properly discounted from the clue to reflect the fact that if the bid wins, then the clue was the most extreme above the value of the object. The proposed resolution of the paradox is that individuals may be rational but they fail to anticipate and incorporate the rationality of others into their decisions. They fail to realize that they will win the auction only when they have the highest signal and/or they fail to discount by the appropriate order statistic.
The second example is called the centipede game. In this process, two individuals participate in a finite sequence of moves that involve options of the following sort. The first person has an option of two amounts of money {x, y } with the property that x > 2y. If the chooser takes one of the amounts of money, the process ends with the choosing agent keeping the amount taken and the other agent receiving the other amount. If the first agent passes, then both amounts of money are doubled and the second player has the choice between {2x, 2y} or passing back to player one and allowing both amounts to double. If players continue to pass, then at the kth decision the amounts will be {2kx, 2ky}. The process is known (publicly) to terminate at decision T at which point the choosing agent must choose the higher of {2Tx, 2Ty} and does not have an option to pass.
A natural game theoretic representation of the process is a game with perfect information. The Nash equilibrium of such a game is for the first chooser to take the largest amount and terminate the game immediately. This result follows by backward induction from the terminal period, the perfect information, and the "rationality" of both players. The T -1 player should recognize that he or she will get the smaller amount if "pass" is chosen and, therefore, would choose to take the larger amount at T -1 and stop the game. However, the T -2 player anticipates that and so would terminate at T -2. The logic works its way back to t = 0. Interest in the game stems directly from the lack of intuitive appeal of the (only) Nash equilibrium.
Experiments The dots in the figure are contracts executed through a computerized market. As can be seen, the assets began trading at prices slightly below the expected value and in period 2 prices are near the expected value. However, by period 3 the assets were trading above expected value. Prices increased slowly from period to period even though the expected value was falling. By period 10 the assets were trading at prices equal to the maximum possible yield and by period 11 prices were above the maximum possible yield. Such high prices could not have been due to optimism about fundamental values. In period 14 a violent market crash occurred as prices fall to levels near the expected value. The time series clearly demonstrates the properties of a bubble and a market crash.
A puzzle emerges. How can markets populated with rational agents have such properties? How can the models be changed to account for this phenomena?
The experimental literature and the theoretical literature contain some hints about possible solutions to all three paradoxes, the winner's curse, the centipede and asset market bubbles. Rationality of agents might not be public information. Each agent might be rational but might also be unsure about the rationality of others. Perhaps the rationality of others is only learned by experience. Recall, in the centipede game, experience seemed to foster more Nash-like behavior. People seemed to learn that other people were prepared to defect. Similarly, the "bigger fool" beliefs could account for asset market bubbles. If an agent believes that he or she can sell the asset to someone else for the same price next period, then the dividend is obtained free. In the bubble experiments experience in asset markets makes the bubble "pop" sooner and after three or four such market experiences, the bubbles almost completely disappear. The fact that "bigger fools" do not exist may become public information with experience in the market. Step 6: Say's Law of Experimental Methods Takes Over
The famous law of J. B. Say, that supply creates its own demand, seems applicable to the case of experimental research. The application of experimental methods generates research questions that can only be answered by a more intense use of experimental methods. The supply of experimental research creates a demand for even more experimental research. When Say's law of experimental methods takes over, the stage is set for an ever increasing tendency to use experiments. The stage becomes set for economics to slowly but surely become a laboratory experimental science.
The sections above illustrate how it has happened in one case. Experiments suggest that moder theory is on the right track (Step 4). Models based on principles of game theory clearly receive much support in the experimental literature. When applied to simple cases, such models are more accurate than any theory found in any branch of any other science that might be applied to those cases. However, paradoxes exist (Step 5). Phenomena exist that are clearly beyond the explanatory capacities of moder models. But the existence of such phenomena does not mean that theory should stop. Versions of the theory that might readily account for the phenomena by removing the central role of publicness of rationality already exist in the literature. Such theories are not particularly well developed and must be appended by special theories of information and learning. Considerably more experimental work will be necessary to determine if changes in the rationality postulates are the correct way to push theory and to narrow the options from the many different forms that such theory might take. This need for new experiments brings us to Step 6. The supply of experimental research creates a demand for more experimental research.
I'm reminded of the joke about the man who was talking with his physician after having taken a series of tests the week before. The physician first tells the man the good news: "The test report said that you would die in twenty-four hours." Shocked and outraged, the man yells "How can you say that? How can that be good news? What could possibly be the bad news?" The physician looks at him sadly. "The bad news is," says the physician, "we got the test results
yesterday."
To those who are not enthusiastic about the use of laboratory experimental methods, the prohibitionists so to speak, the good news is that the profession has tasted the devil's brew, the use of experimental methods, and likes it. "If that is the good news, what on earth could be the bad news?", the prohibitionists might ask. The bad news is that all six of the seductive steps to sin and intoxication have occurred in almost every subfield of economics. Those who have not been touched are being tempted. Say's law of experimental methods seems to be operating everywhere. The impact might not be noticeable yet but the process is operating. Let me be clear about my answer to the question posed by the title of this paper. I do not believe that experimental methods will replace field research. Economies found in the wild can only be understood by studying them in the wild. Field research is absolutely critical to such an understanding. However, the theories and models used in field research necessarily incorporate many judgments about assumptions, parameters and behavioral principles. The simple cases that can be studied in the laboratory can provide the data against which the importance of such judgments can be assessed. Economics is one of the few sciences that is fortunate to have both the field and the laboratory with which to work. The thesis of this paper is that the laboratory methodology, which has historically been absent, will grow apd become an important partner in a joint effort to isolate the principles which govern economic behavior.
